Abstract: This paper analyses the impact of education networks on the FDI from the United States and United Kingdom to 167 countries during 1999-2011. Proxies of networks are international students in the United States and United Kingdom and American and British alumni associations abroad. Results show that international students boost British FDI, while their influence on American FDI is weaker and restricted to non-OECD economies. International alumni associations strongly attract both American and British FDI to the alumni home countries. The different impact of education networks on American and British FDI is partly related to the two countries' use of soft and hard power. The pro-FDI effects of student ties are disrupted by the use of hard power.
Introduction
According to UNESCO's definition and statistics, international students are students who move to a foreign country for the purpose of tertiary studies. 1 They were 50.000 in 1950, 2.1 million in 2002, and 3.4 million in 2010. This huge growth in numbers has stimulated debate and research on its causes and, partly, also on its consequences. In recent years, the economic research has focused on students' motivations to move abroad, universities' incentives to attract foreign students (Bessey 2012; Beine, Romain, and Lionel 2012 ; Kahanec and Králiková 2011; Haupt, Krieger, and Lange 2011; Van Bouwel and Veugelers 2010) , and human capital gains and losses for destination and home countries (Le 2010; Chellaraj, Maskus, and Mattoo 2008; Freeman 2010) . Only few studies consider another, important, effect of international movements: their bridging potential in terms of economic, political and cultural links between origin and destination countries. Among these, Spilimbergo (2009) measures the influence of foreign education on countries' political systems, and (Murat 2014) tests the effects of international students on bilateral trade.
The education ties developed by international students during the years at university and their effects on FDI are the subject of this study. Student ties, based on friendship, mutual trust and attachment to the alma mater, tend to be quite robust and enduring (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008) . Moreover, international students possess a specific knowledge on the institutions, culture and social norms of host and home countries. Education networks, as the wider category of social networks, channel valuable information on economic opportunities abroad and provide social control on the potentially opportunistic behaviour of members. In them, however, these mechanisms are likely to be especially effective. Their participants, by being skilled individuals, linked to a common alma mater and endowed with valuable transnational human and social capital, can obtain above average gains by sharing their knowledge, but also face substantial losses by behaving opportunistically.
Destination countries sometimes see international students as a vehicle for improving diplomatic and political relations with their home countries. In this perspective, foreign students are a form of soft power. Nye (2005) defines soft power as the capacity of influencing the preferences of others through persuasion and attraction, rather than through coercion or payment. Among various forms of soft power, the transmission of cultural and political standards through education proves to be particularly effective. Soft power exerted through international students aims at the elites of foreign countries, and is expected to influence countries' politics, institutions, and economy. This paper tests the influence of university ties on countries' bilateral economic exchanges, in particular, on the foreign direct investments (FDI) from the United States and United Kingdom into 167 students' home countries. The United States and the United Kingdom are the two main destinations of international students worldwide. In 2010, 21 % and 12 % of all international students were attending American and British universities (UNESCO). The analysis is based on panel data on FDI, international students and other covariates, from year 1999 to 2011. Cross sections on students who attended university during 1970 are also used. They measure the effects of mature individuals with American or British education on the bilateral FDI of 1999-2011. Another, more direct indicator of active networking activity is the number of alumni associations of United States and United Kingdom universities in each foreign country. Alumni associations are a common phenomenon of universities of English-speaking countries; often their branches spread to many locations worldwide. As no official statistics on their numbers exist, I collected the evidence provided by universities' websites or kindly supplied by the universities themselves. With these figures I built two novel databases on the alumni associations of American and British universities in the 167 partner countries considered.
This study contributes to the existing literature in two main ways. First, by using an augmented gravity model, it tests the effects of education networks on foreign direct investments. Second, it tests whether these effects vary as other forms of power are used by destination countries. In particular, I consider forms of soft power, such as Aid or cultural diplomacy, and of hard power, such as wars or covert action. While data on Aid and wars are available from both destination countries, data on cultural diplomacy are available only from the United Kingdom and on covert action from the United States. Previous expectations are that all kinds of soft power, by increasing trust between countries (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2009) , have a positive effect on bilateral FDI, that wars have a negative influence (Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008) , and covert action has a positive one (Berger et al., 2013) . These alternative forms of power are also expected to alter, positively or negatively, the pro-FDI effects of international students.
The main findings of this paper are that the effects of international students on bilateral FDI are positive and strong for the United Kingdom and positive but weaker for the United States. Regarding the latter, they are restricted to non-OECD partner countries. On the other hand, alumni associations strongly attract both American and British FDI to the alumni home economies. Wars and covert action reduce the positive effects of student ties on FDI. These results are robust to different regressors and dependent variables. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents some main facts and the literature on social and education networks. Section 3 presents some descriptive statistics and the sources of data. The estimation strategy is developed in successive steps is in Section 4. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 gives the conclusions.
Facts and Literature
International students and scholars, together with literature and classical music, are forms of soft power directed to the elites. Hosting foreign students and scholars is often considered a very effective way of influencing the politics and the economy of foreign countries.
2 At the other extreme, hard power is the use of force through wars, military coercion, or economic blockades. Espionage and covert action are usually classified as hard power, even though their influence on foreign countries is less clear Nye (2005) . Hard power is thought to deploy its consequences in the short run, while soft power is supposed to have long-lasting consequences. An often debated point is whether or not soft power without the backing of force can actually be effective. Nye names smart power the wise combination of the two. The view that international students can be useful for influencing foreign nations is not new. Back in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Britain hosted students from all over the world. There were fewer students from poor countries than from rich ones, but the bridging potential of the former was seen as the most important and precious, since economic relations with rich and settlement countries were already well established (Pietsch 2013 ) . In turn, students from poor countries moved to study in Britain because this could lead to prestigious jobs when returning to the home country, especially in the professions, commerce and bureaucracy. In later decades, some of the leaders of decolonization and independence had been at school and university in the colonial country (Spilimbergo 2009; Perraton 2014) .
After the second world war, the economic and political influence of the United States overcame that of the United Kingdom. By becoming a superpower, the United States became also a preferred destination of international students. However, it had to compete with another superpower, the Soviet Union, which was also interested into attracting students from abroad in order to exert its own international influence. With the world divided into two separate blocks, each superpower offered scholarships and fellowships to foreign students and scholars (Perraton 2014; Spilimbergo 2009; Pietsch 2013) . As before, of special interest were students originating from Third World countries, but now the main motivation was to keep these countries from falling under the influence of the competing nation. Hence, the main goal of American and Soviet authorities was firstly political, economic interests came second (Brawner and Lucas 2007) . The Cold War, and the ever-present possibility of a devastating armed confrontation between the two superpowers, made the use of cultural persuasion and soft power necessary.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the division of the world into two contending blocks, the political and economic world scenario became gradually more heterogeneous and fragmented. During the nineties, perhaps because of its role of unique leading nation, the interest of the United States on foreign students faded, and the funds dedicated to international scholarships gradually shrank (Brawner and Lucas 2007) . Later, after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the country adopted restrictive entry policies regarding immigration, which included foreign students.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the United Kingdom maintained more open policies on foreign students for a longer time. During the empire, the British government was interested into attracting foreign students to improve international relations; after the second world war, perhaps because of the lost supremacy, this interest even increased. It lasted until 2010, when measures on international students, entry visas, grants and scholarships became more restrictive (Perraton 2014) .
In seeing international students as a potential vehicle of soft power, governments implicitly rely on the attachment students tend to develop for their university friends and mates, the alma mater and the hosting country. Specifically on the friendship ties built at university, Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006) , Mayer and Puller (2008) , Arcidiacono, Khan, and Vigdor (2011 ), Baker, Mayer, and Puller (2011 ), Neri and Ville (2008 , find that they tend to be particularly robust. These studies are based on data from American colleges and universities. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) test the investment decisions of individuals who can place their investments either with former university mates or with anonymous partners, and find that university mates are significantly preferred. This suggests that university ties are be long-lasting, and can gradually develop into business links.
Students' friendship and network ties belong in the wider class of social networks. A branch of the literature analyses the effect of social networks on the economic exchanges (Granovetter 1973) . The base assumption of networks' theory is that social interactions between individuals, through informationdiffusing and behaviour-enforcing mechanisms, lower the fixed costs of market transactions. At the international level, fixed costs are increased by social, cultural, and institutional dissimilarities between countries. People living outside their home country can share information on economic opportunities abroad, and help to smooth-out dissimilarities between home and destination economies. By lowering the fixed costs of international transactions, they can boost bilateral trade and FDI between (Rauch 1999 (Rauch , 2001 ). Several studies, mostly based on data on international migrants, provide empirical support for these hypothesis. After the seminal work by Gould (1994) and Head and Ries (1998) numerous authors measure the impact of migrant networks on bilateral trade. Among others, Wagner, Head, and Reis (2002) , Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005) , Herander and Saavedra (2005) , Blanes and Martín-Montaner (2006) , White (2007) , Tadesse and White (2008) Bandyopadhyay, Coughlin, and Wall (2008) , Buch, Kleinert, and Toubal (2006) , Peri and Requena (2010) , Aleksynska and Peri (2014) , Egger, Ehrlich, and Nelson (2012) , Felbermayr and Toubal (2012) . A related set of studies test the relation between international networks and bilateral FDI (Gao 2003; Tong 2005) . Some results show that FDI are more likely to be promoted by networks of skilled individuals than from average ones (Docquier and Lodigiani 2010; Javorcik et al. 2011; Flisi and Murat 2011) . Regarding the dissimilarity-smoothing role of networks, Girma and Yu (2002) , Dunlevy (2006) , Kugler and Rapoport (2007) , Tong (2005) provide support to the thesis that the effects of network ties are stronger on the economic exchanges between less similar countries. Finally, regarding the soft power exerted through international students, Spilimbergo (2009) finds that democracy in destination countries is positively transmitted to the students' home countries. Nye (2005) provides descriptive evidence on improvements in political and institutional relations between origin and destination countries.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
This paper uses three proxies for education networks: International students, who are students that attended American and British universities during 1999-2011, International students 1970 , who attended university during the academic years 1970, and the number of Alumni associations of American and British universities in foreign countries. The two variables, International students and International students 1970 , concern stocks of international students registered during each academic year. Alumni associations, a more direct proxy of networking activity, is timeinvariant. It reports the decision of former students of a certain university to create a formal group, remain linked to the alma mater, meet on regular basis, and exchange news and information on issues of common interest. More than student ties, associations are likely to convey valuable economic knowledge and information on foreign markets, which can influence foreign investments.
For the purpose of this investigation, I collected the information available on universities' websites on alumni associations during year 2012, with which I built two variables, one concerning 1759 American, and the other 1895 British associations. Figure 3 shows that the proportion of international students in the United States on world totals decreases constantly since the end of the eighties. This can be explained by the diminished interest of the country on international students after the Cold War, and by other destinations becoming more attractive for students. The contraction in the Unites States is more pronounced after 2002, when not only the proportion, but also absolute number of students fall as an 4 Business alumni associations of Harvard, Stanford, Oxford, Rutgers, Penn state and several other universities have their distinct offices and websites. On the Alumni website of Penn State University is written: 'The Penn State community includes more than 610,000 alumni located in every corner of the world. Within that network, graduates of the Smeal College of Business number more than 74,000.' More specifically, the number of Penn State Alumni with Penn State Alumni Association Membership is more than 172,000, about 30. % of the total'. If the same proportion is applied to Smeal College, then registered members of business alumni associations are about 23.000. If only one third of all associate alumni are abroad (using the proportion of Oxford alumni abroad), then there are 52,460 associated alumni, of whom 6,780 business alumni, of Penn State University alone in foreign countries. Some Alumni associations of the London Business School membership numbers are: 2,399 in China, 4,307 in India, 3,900 in other Asian countries, 1,275 in Australia and New Zealand, 2,158 in Brazil, 2,782 in other Latin American countries, 2,502 in Africa, over 1,300 in the Middle East, 1,694 in eastern Europe, 1,930 in France, 544 in Greece.
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effect of the country's restrictive policies on students' visas. The same share in the United Kingdom follows a quite different path: increasing until the end of the nineties, and becoming flat or decreasing only slightly afterwards. Given the rapid increase in the world number of international students, even to the flat part corresponds a positive growth in levels.
Up to this point, geographic areas rather than the level of development of countries have been considered. However, differences in development become relevant in relation to the hypothesis that social links matter more between more dissimilar economies. Moreover, as seen above, governments of destination countries often see students as vehicles for soft power, and students originating from developing and Third World economies as those endowed with the 40 1968 1971 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 USA UK In what follows, OECD economies will represent developed countries, and non-OECD economies less developed countries. Table 1 shows that during 1999-2011 the majority of international students in American and British universities originate from other developed -OECD -countries. Specifically, students from the average developed (OECD) economy in the United States are more than twice of those from the developing (non-OECD) country, while in the United Kingdom this proportion is about four to one. However, student numbers from non-OECD economies grow more rapidly. During the period considered, the number of students from developing countries increased at a rate of 11.2 % per year in the United States and 9.75 % in the United Kingdom, while the growth rates from developed economies were about 3 % in both the United States and United Kingdom. Figures 1(a,b) show that the rapid growth rate in the United States is driven especially by Asian students, while in the United Kingdom the number of students from Asia and Africa grow rapidly. The distribution of Alumni associations is similar to that of international students: largest numbers belong to OECD countries. Table 1 also shows that, similarly to international students, American and British multinationals invest especially in other developed (OECD) countries, but also that FDI in developing economies grow more rapidly. Figure 2 (a), (b) show that the fastest growth rates concern Asian countries. Detailed definitions and sources of all variables and data utilized in this paper are listed in Table 6 .
Estimation Strategy

Baseline Specification
The basic question I seek to examine is whether international students in United States and United Kingdom and alumni abroad influence the volume of FDI from the two host countries to the students' home countries. To do so, I firstly estimate the following gravity base model (Feenstra 2004) :
where the dependent variable is the stock of outward FDI of the United States or United Kingdom in country c at time t. The explanatory variable of interest is Education networks. Its proxies are, respectively, the stocks of International students from country c at time t present in the United States or United Kingdom and the stocks of Alumni associations of American or British universities in country c. International students 1970 , students who attended Alumni associations: number of alumni associations of USA and UK Universities in partner countries.
Students and Investments Abroad university at the beginning of the seventies are also considered. Data are from years 1999 to 2011. X ct is a vector including several variables, specific to the partner country c, commonly used in the literature on FDI determinants. They are: GDP, a proxy for the purchasing power of consumers in the partner country; Population size to capture the potential market size of the country; Distance of the country from the Unites States or United Kingdom to account for transaction costs related to travel, communications and cultural distance; the average Inflation in country c at time t to control for macroeconomic stability; a time-varying index of the Quality of institutions, to proxy the bureaucratic and political costs of transactions; the proportion of people speaking English, to denote cultural similarities and possibility of obtaining information about business conditions; and Free trade agreements between the United States or the United Kingdom and the partner country. The model includes time dummies, α t . All variables, except dummies and percentages are in logarithms. Countries fixed effects are added in further specification, where time-invariant cofactors are not included. 
Endogeneity
The proxy for education networks International students 1970 , concerning former students, who attended university about three decades before the time of the FDI, can be safely thought to be uncorrelated with the error terms of eq. [1]. Moreover, as seen above (Section 2), part of these students were accepted in American and British universities because of soft power reasons, unrelated to economic considerations. Alumni associations might in principle suffer from endogeneity problems, but they are a longer run phenomenon than international students. Hence, also in this case, endogeneity can be ruled out.
On the other hand, coefficients on International students can suffer from reverse causality, omitted variable bias, or measurement error. To try to obviate for these problems, I estimate this variable's effects on trade by using the Blundell and Bond (1998) System GMM in levels and differences, and include the lagged dependent variable among regressors to account for hysteresis in FDI. The model specification is now based on one equation in first differences and one in levels. For the former the instruments used are the lagged levels of variables and for the latter the instruments are the lagged differences:
and
where d denotes first differences. The Sys-GMM specification, by including the lagged bilateral FDI, controls for the time-varying component of countries' effects (Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehman 2009).
Soft, Covert and Hard Power
The worldwide economic and political importance of the two destination countries differ enough to affect the capacity of the respective multinationals of accessing foreign markets. Hence, potential omitted variables in the above specification should relate to alternative forms of power or persuasion used by the United States and United Kingdom in their interactions with other countries. Given that international students can in turn represent a form of soft power, the interactions of the above factors with International students are also of interest. Hence, to the above specification, I add, first, two covariates representing, respectively, the use of soft power or force. One is the amount of economic aid (in millions of United States $) provided by each destination economy to the partner country, the other is the number of wars fought with it since the end of the second world war. As aid can improve the trust of people on the donor country, it can be considered a form of soft power. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) find that higher levels of trust between people of two different countries positively affect the bilateral economic exchanges between the countries. At the same time, aid can also affect FDI by positively influencing the preferences of consumers for goods of the donor country. Moreover, aid provisions are often accompanied by bilateral trade and, in some cases, investment treaties (Selaya and Sunesen 2012) . For similar and opposite reasons, the number of wars fought with the foreign country are expected to have a direct disruptive influence on trade and FDI (Barbieri and Levy 1999; Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008) and an indirect effect through the weakening of trust and social ties -including education ties -between people in the two countries. While the effect of wars is expected to be negative, it must also be considered that after the second world war, wars have been increasingly fought for political or humanitarian reasons, rather than for military victories over the 'enemy country', and, especially regarding the United Kingdom, together with a wide coalition of countries. The effects on bilateral FDI of these locally and temporarily limited wars can therefore be less disruptive that those of more traditional ones. This makes the coefficient on the Wars variable more difficult to sign a priory.
I then add two covariates, one in the regressions concerning the United States and the other in those concerning the United Kingdom. In the first, I include a variable on the use of covert power. Both the United States and the United Kingdom governments rely on the services of secret intelligence agencies operating in foreign countries, and indicators of their activities for both countries would be useful for the purpose of this study, but only the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has made information on past operations publicly available. Using these data, Berger et al. (2013) find that, during the Cold War years, 1945 to 1989, CIA interventions in foreign countries had a positive impact on United States exports to those countries. They also find that the effect is higher with less democratic countries. In this paper I use the data made available by Berger et al. to test the impact of the number of CIA operations in the foreign country from 1945 to 1989 on American investments in the country after the Cold War, during 1999-2011. Hence, differently than Berger et al., I test the effect of past CIA operations on FDI, rather than of CIA operations on exports of the same time period. Following Berger et al. (2013) the coefficient on CIA could be expected to take a positive value, but following Nye (2005) , and his thesis on covert intervention being in fact hard power, it should take a negative one.
In the regressions on data from the United Kingdom, I add a proxy for cultural diplomacy: the number of branches of the British Council in the foreign country. The British Council professed goal is of disseminating abroad the culture and language of the United Kingdom, and of building trust between people of the United Kingdom and other countries. Its website clearly describes the soft power component of this task. Specifically, it states that the British Foreign Office endorses 'the British Council' as an 'invaluable part of United Kingdom's soft power armoury'. The British Council provides useful information and practical services to students wishing to study in Britain, and other people wishing to know the United Kingdom. Other countries with similar institutions are France with the Alliance Francaise, Germany, with the Goethe Institut, Italy, with the Dante Alighieri Association, Spain, with the Instituto Cervantes, China, with the Confucius Institute. A corresponding variable cannot be added in the regressions on United States' data because there isn't a recognized American institution devoted to cultural diplomacy. The coefficient on the British Council variable is expected to be positive.
The variables Aid, British Council, CIA and Wars, by being expressions of soft, covert and hard power, can be all be expected to affect FDI and also to be potentially correlated with International students. In particular, hard and covert power, having disruptive effects on the relations between countries, should weaken the positive influence of education links on FDI. On the other hand, soft power factors, such as Aid or British Council, should be positively correlated with FDI, but their interaction with International students cannot be signed a priory. It will be positive if the two have a complementary influence on trade, and negative if they substitute each other. Table 2 depicts the coefficients of the baseline regressions and evidence three main results. First, the impact of International students is positive, stronger and more robust on British than on American bilateral FDI. Second, international students who attended American and British universities during the beginning of the seventies, International students 1970 , mature workers and professionals during the FDI timespan, have a positive and significant influence on both American and British FDI. Third, Alumni associations have a stronger and more significant influence on FDI than international students.
Results
Baseline Specification: OLS and FE
More specifically, regarding the baseline specification of regression (1), coefficients on International students in the United Kingdom regressions are positive, high and significant in all specifications, while they are not significant in the United States regressions. In Model 6 of Table 2 , a 1 % increase in the number of students originating from country c increases the British FDI in country c by 0.32 %; with significance at 1 %. The magnitude of the coefficient shrinks to 0.18 when countries' fixed effects are added to the model (Model 9). Hence, the relation between international students in the United Kingdom and the British FDI investments in the students' home countries is positive and significant, with a magnitude varying between 0.18 and 0.32.
International students 1970 have a similar, positive and significant influence on both American and British investments abroad. Specifically, a 1 % increase in International students 1970 in the partner country improves the American FDI in the country by 0.26 % and the British FDI by 0.22 %. Significance in both cases is at 1 % (Models 2 and 7 in Table 2 ). Hence, university ties built at the beginning of the seventies by individuals who are in their maturity during 1999-2011 show to be still alive, and strongly affect the bilateral FDI. In 
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Students and Investments Abroad particular, their effects on United States' FDI are stronger and more significant than those of more recent cohorts. At first sight, the result regarding the United States could be due to a different composition of countries of students and FDI between 1970 and 1999-2011: communist countries were underrepresented during the Cold War, while they are among the first in terms of students' numbers in American universities and, regarding specifically Asia, of American FDI. However, a similar change has taken place in students in Britain and British FDI abroad, without leading to the same result. As Table  2 shows, the British bilateral FDI are positively and significantly influenced by both old and recent cohorts of international students. A more likely explanation for the non-significant effect of recent networks on the American FDI is the stagnation and fall in student inflows in the country after 2001 (Figure 1(a) ). The Alumni associations of both American and British universities exert a strong power of attraction on the American and British FDI in the alumni home countries. Specifically, a 1 % increase in Alumni associations boosts the American FDI by almost 0.82 % (Model 3, Table 2 ), and the same increase in the number of alumni associations of British universities increases the British FDI by 0.72 % (Model 8). In both cases significance is at 1 %. The positive and significant effect of Alumni on the American FDI, different from that of international students, may be explained by associations being a longer run phenomenon. Also, they are a closest proxy for active networking activity than stocks of international students. Furthermore, alumni are individuals with a foreign education, living in their home countries and with above-average salaries and occupations. Hence, alumni associations are more effective than student networks in channelling valuable economic information on economic opportunities abroad, and in enforcing control mechanisms on the behaviour of members.
Control variables, GDP, Population and Distance bear the expected signs. Inflation appears to be uncorrelated to the British investments abroad, but has a positive and significant correlation with American FDI. This is due perhaps to the relatively greater amount of investments from the this country into Latin America and other economies characterized by low macroeconomic stability. The Quality of institutions is strongly correlated with the United Kingdom investments abroad (Model 8, Table 2 ) and not significant for the United States FDI. In turn, this result may be due to the relatively high amount of British investments in the European Union and in countries of the Commonwealth, a factor that is controlled for in the fixed effects regressions of Models 4 and 9. A higher percentage of people speaking English in the foreign country makes the country more attractive for both American and British outward FDI (Models 1-3 and 6-8).
A usual matter of concern in the literature on FDI is that the variable may contain many zeroes. In this study FDI are stocks rather than flows, and the proportion of zeroes is not high: about 20 % of all observations, both for the United Kingdom and the United States. However, a consequence of taking logs is that the conversion of zero FDI into missing values may introduce selection bias and cause loss of valuable information. To deal with this problem, as several other authors, I sum one to all FDI values before taking logs. As this procedure, in turn, may inflate coefficients, I re-ran all regressions without the adjustment. Results do not change significantly and are available upon request.
Endogeneity: System GMM
Coefficients on International students estimated with OLS can suffer from endogeneity bias. Hence, I rerun the regression using the Blundell-Bond System GMM estimator in levels and differences. To control for hysteresis, I also add the lagged value of the dependent variable among regressors (eq. [2a] and [2b]). Results in Table 2 obtained with the Sys-GMM estimator confirm and reinforce previous findings (Models 5 and 10). Student networks have a high and significant impact on the bilateral British FDI, and a lower and non-significant influence on the American FDI. A 1 % increase in the number of International students in the United Kingdom leads to an improvement of 0.29 % of the British FDI to the students' home countries. As expected, the value of this GMM coefficient lies between values 0.33 and 0.18 of the OLS Models 6 and 9 in Table 2 (Roodman 2009 ). Hansen tests confirm the validity of results. The same coefficient in the regression concerning the United States FDI is positive but not significant (Model 5).
Soft, Covert and Hard Power
The different geopolitical roles played by the United States and United Kingdom on the international stage can affect the way in which American and British multinationals enter foreign markets, and the importance of education networks in this process. Hence, I add to the above specification two covariates. The first, Aid, meant as soft power, is the quantity of aid transfers (in US$) provided to the foreign country, and the second, Wars, indicating the use of force, is the number of wars fought with the foreign country since 1945. Subsequently, in the regressions on United States data, I add the number of CIA interventions in the partner country during the Cold War period, 1945 War period, -1989 , and, in the regressions concerning the British FDI, I include the number of British Council branches in the foreign country. The first is a proxy for covert power, while the second is a further proxy for soft power, in the form of cultural diplomacy. Both variables are expected to affect FDI directly, and indirectly through their interactions with International students.
Results in Table 3 show that the Total effect of Aid on bilateral FDI is nonsignificant in both the United States and United Kingdom regressions (Models 1 and 6). However, regarding the United States, the interaction between Aid transfers and International students appears to have a positive effect: the coefficient on International students × Aid is low but positive, and is significant at the 10 % level (Model 1). For the United States, the two kinds of soft power complement each other. The coefficient on the same interaction is instead negative in the regressions on British data: in this case, the two forms of soft power are substitutes. Another proxy for soft power is the cultural diplomacy exerted by the United Kingdom through the British Council. In this case, differently than expected, the coefficient on the Total effect of British Council is non-significant. Not significant is also the coefficient on the interacted variable, International students × British Council. The raw data show that, despite a declared aim of the British Council is to attract potential international students to universities in the United Kingdom, the simple correlation between British Council and International students is just 0.28, while the correlation between British Council and Alumni is 0.21. These results suggest that the United Kingdom uses different forms of soft power in different world areas.
Wars are the opposite of soft power: they should disrupt social and economic relations (Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008) between countries. However, results show that the Total effect of Wars on British FDI is positive and significant (Model 6, Table 3 ). This may be explained by the fact that, after the second world war, the United Kingdom has participated mostly into armed conflicts having political and humanitarian. Results show that the same coefficient is not significant when the dependent variable is the United States' FDI (Model 2). The interaction between wars and international students is as expected: armed conflicts reduce the positive effects of education ties on investments. The coefficient on the interacted variable International students × Wars is negative both for the United States and the United Kingdom, but it is significant only for the latter. Interestingly, the United States coefficient on the interacted term becomes negative and significant if Vietnam (an outlier in terms of years of war, but among the top fifteen countries in terms of foreign students in American universities) is excluded from the panel. This suggests that students from Vietnam compensate for the disruptive effects of war on the data between 1999 and 2011. In SYS-GMM models control variables are all treated as predetermined and are instrumented for using their own first to third lags in level and differences. The total effect of International students is calculated summing the coefficients on relations between the two countries. The negative effect of wars on education networks is further reinforced if also South Korea is excluded from the United States sample. Regarding covert power, results show that the Total effect of CIA interventions during the Cold War years on American FDI is non-significant (Model 3, Table 3 ). This partially differs from Berger et al. (2013) , who find a positive effect of CIA on exports. One explanation for the present result can be it concerns the impact of covert power on FDI and not on trade. However, trade and FDI are aspects of the more general economic exchanges with the foreign country, and effects on them could be expected to be similar. Another, more likely, reason, is that Berger et al. measure the effects of CIA interventions on the same period trade flows, while this study tests their effects on FDI at later time, during 1999 time, during -2011 time, during . Years 1999 time, during -2011 differ from the Cold War era in significant ways. One is that during the Cold War CIA interventions in communist countries were strongly limited, while now these countries are origin of international students or destination of American multinationals, or both. Some of the economies listed among the top 20 FDI destinations, such as China, the Russian Federation or Kazakhstan, were not there before 1989. However, and more importantly, as expected, the joint impact of CIA with education networks, International students × CIA, is negative and significant (Model 3). This suggests that education ties are weakened in countries where there were more CIA interventions, and, in general, that even in the long run the use of covert power diminishes the positive influence of soft power. Differently from Nye (2005) , who assumed that hard power had short run effects and soft power a long run impact, hard power in the form of covert action can have long-lasting effects.
Table 3 also shows that, regarding the United States, the Total effect of International students is positive and significant in Models 2 and 3 (not in Model 1). Up to now, these are the only specifications in which the overall effect of education networks on American FDI is positive. The effect, however, is positive only when the interactions of students with Wars and CIA are controlled for. In Model 4, with the same number of observations and including all covariates but not the interacted variables, the coefficient on International students turns again to be non-significant. Differently, regarding the United Kingdom, coefficients on the Total effect of International students and on International students are always positive and significant (Models 6-9), with magnitudes that remain similar to those obtained with the previous specifications of Table 2 . This confirms the robustness of results on the United Kingdom education ties.
Developed and Developing Partner Countries
One hypothesis of networks theory is that network effects on economic exchanges are stronger between less similar countries (Dunlevy 2006) . Therefore, to test whether the incidence of education networks linked to less developed partners differ from their overall effect, OECD countries are excluded from the sample in Models 5 and 10 of Table 3 . Results, in this case, are that student networks linked to more dissimilar -less developed -countries, positively and significantly attract American FDI to the home economies (Model 5). This provides support to the hypothesis on dissimilarity. Specifically, a 1 % increase in students from a non-OECD country rises the American FDI to the country by 0.16 %. Interestingly, however, further tests show that this result is driven by the Asian, and specifically South-East Asian, economies. If these countries are excluded from the non-OECD sample, the coefficient on International students is again non-significant. Regarding the United Kingdom, the result on the non-OECD sample does not differ significantly from those on the entire dataset (but the magnitude of the coefficient on International students linked to non-OECD countries is slightly higher).
The overall magnitude of these effects can now be taken into consideration. The number of international students from the average country in the United Kingdom is 1791. Considering the preferred specification, Model 10 in Table 2 , a 10 % increase in the average number of registered students would amount to an increase of 179 students per country. The stocks of British investments in the average foreign country amount to $12,573 million. Then, the 10 % increase in students would lead to a 2.88 % increase in the stock of FDI (coefficient on International students, Model 10), or to an extra value of $362 million. This means that one additional average student would generate an increase of $2.02 million of the British stock of FDI in the students' economy.
As above, the magnitude of the impact of non-OECD students on American investments abroad can be calculated by considering that a 10 % increase in students from the average non-OECD country (Table 1) amounts to 260 more students, and that this increase leads to 1.58 % more American FDI in the non-OECD country (Model 5, Table 3 ). The value of the average United States investment in the non-OECD country is $3,324.80 (Table 1) , and 1.58 % of it is $52.53 million. Hence, an extra student from a non-OECD country generates an increase in the stock of FDI from the United States in the student's home economy of $202,057. This is a significantly lower magnitude than in the United Kingdom. The difference between the two depends on the smaller value of the coefficient on International students in the United States regressions, and on its significance being restricted to non-OECD economies, where the average value of the American FDI is about twenty times smaller than in OECD countries (Table 1) . 6 
Robustness
Results in Table 2 show that students registered in the early seventies still have a strong effect on United States and United Kingdom FDI, but that the effect on United States FDI vanishes with the more recent cohorts of students. As a further check of robustness, I test the effect on FDI of foreign students registered in United States universities fifteen years after 1970, in 1985, still Table 2 ). Furthermore, the coefficient is robust to the introduction of the CIA variable among the covariates, while, as in previous tests, CIA interventions have no direct effect on FDI (Model 2, Table 4 ). The coefficient on the interacted variable International students 1985 × CIA, is negative and significant, supporting previous findings suggesting that the use of covert power has a negative influence on international education ties (Model 3). The same test is performed with students registered during 1993, International students 1993 , and results remain overall the same (Models 4-6, Table 4 ). Year 1993 has been selected because it is the first in UNESCO statistics registering the new world order, following the fall of the Berlin wall. These findings provide support to two previous results: the first is that individuals who studied in American universities during the Cold War period and immediately after have a positive and significant effect on the United States' FDI, an effect that is lost with the younger cohorts of the last decade. The second is that past CIA interventions have a disruptive impact on international education ties and a weak or nonrobust direct influence on FDI. Finally, regressions have been rerun by adding further institutional and cultural covariates, among which the proportion of people of Christian religion in the partner country, the stocks of immigrants from it in the United States and United Kingdom and, regarding the United 6 The magnitude of the impact is higher than that of an average business immigrant in the USA on USA imports ($61,637) in Aleksynska and Peri (2014) , or of an average international student on British imports ($56,028) and exports ($31,430) in Murat (2014) , but the average flow of American and British imports and exports is also several times smaller than the stocks of these countries' investments in the average foreign economy. Kingdom, the partner country's status of ex-colony or Commonwealth member. Results do not change significantly.
Conclusions
International education networks' participants are skilled individuals with a foreign education and an extremely valuable transnational social capital, which includes a knowledge on the institutions and culture of the country of the alma mater. This paper investigated their influence on the investments of the United States and the United Kingdom during 1999-2011. Proxies for education networks were international students, alumni associations of American and British universities in foreign countries, and students who attended university during the Cold War period. The main findings are that international student ties positively and strongly influence the investments of British firms in the students' home countries, while their impact on American FDI is weaker and restricted to non-OECD economies. Moreover, even in this restricted sample, the students' effect on American FDI is lower than that on British FDI on the entire sample. The coefficient on international students on British FDI is 0.28 overall, and 0.45 for the average developing economy. The same coefficient on students on American FDI to non-OECD economies is 0.16. Differently, former cohorts of international students, who attended university in the early seventies, have a similar, positive and strong impact on both British and American bilateral investments. For the United States, the stronger effect of former students may be due to the restrictive policies on students' visas adopted after 2001. This determined a fall in the number of international students in American universities and, possibly, on the effectiveness of their education links. On the other hand, the associations of alumni abroad, a closest proxy for real networking activity than international students, attract very substantial amounts of both American and British FDI into the alumni home countries.
Education networks affect FDI not only through the classical informationdiffusion and behaviour-enforcing mechanisms, but also through the transfer of social, institutional and economic norms from the host to the origin country. The recent literature identifies international students as effective channels of a soft power directed to the elites (Nye 2005) . This study included proxies of international power, such as economic aid, cultural diplomacy, wars, and covert action to test their direct and combined effects on FDI. Results show that the interacted effects of international students and other forms of soft power are mixed, but those between students and hard power, such as wars and covert action, are always negative: even decades after their occurrence, wars and CIA interventions disrupt the positive effects of education ties on FDI. Recent studies emphasise that soft power not backed by hard power can be totally ineffective (Nye 2005) ; this paper's results suggest that hard and covert power without the contemporary use of persuasion may also be unsuccessful. http://www.britishcouncil.org/bcannual-report--.pdf
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